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I. INTROD0CTI2»
This thesis is a continuation of the thesis " The
Preliminary Personnel Data. Base Design for the Indonesian
Navy ", by Moedjiono at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, June 1982.
Since 1977, the Indonesian Navy Data Center
(DISPULAHTAL) has collected and processed personnel data to
support the leadership in the Navy in their decision making.
In 1980 work began on the design of personnel database
system. Computerization of personnel data took place only
within the Department of Personnel and was limited to admin-
istrative purposes. However, other - departments in the Navy,
such as Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, and Planning
,
had to work with an increasing and more complex amount of
data. With every department maintaining its own personnel
data there were discrepancies. Information was often incom-
plete or uniformly updated, sinos not all departments
received data changes. The increasing availability of data,
and the importance of timely decision-making emphasized the
need to establish a computer system which could accommodate
these needs.
Since information is a recognized source of economic
value, the data wich comprise the information should be
secured adequately. 2. B. Fernandez [Ref. 5] defines infor-
mation as:
a critical resource in today's enterprises, whether they
are industrial, commercial, educational, or civic.
Information has been widely recognized as a resource of
economic value to an enterprise.

This thesis proposes to continue the design work of a
personnel database system begun in 1983.
As the use of computers increases, the number of people
who might have access to confidential information also
increases, emphasizing the importance of access security.
In the military, a leakage of information could endanger
national security. Data on secret weapons, numbers and
distribution of personnel, emergency procedures, and
personnel background are important to the enemy.
Internally, misuse cf lata may result in corruption of
totals of data in compiling salary lists or theft cf secret
information for use by the enemy. The absence of any type
of data protection may lead to unintentional errors by an
operator resulting in the destruotion or damage of data.
Natural disasters also may destroy information or data.
Damaged information may lead to inaccurate decisions, which
may jeopardize national security.
To prevent the above mentioned problems, it is essential
to provide protective mechanisms to database systems. In
other words, there is a need for database security.
In view of the developments of personnel database in the
Indonesian Navy and the absence of protective mechanisms,
this thesis propose a concept to provide security for data
that will be the basis for decisions made by the leadership
of the Navy.
There are many varieties of database types, but this
thesis will be limited to the security of personnel data-
base. The six sections cf this th?sis are:
I. Introduction.
II. The current proposed personnel database
systems
III. The needs for security protection.
IV. The Multics concepts.
10

V. Implement ation of Baltics in database
security.
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
.
This personnel database security concept will be a
contribution to the security of computerized data processing
in the Indonesian Navy.
1 1

II. THE 30BHENT PROPOSED PERSONNEL DATA3ASE SYSTEM
The present Database systems [Ref. 3] have the following
objectives:
- Reducing redundancy
- Sharing of data
- Avoiding inconsistency
- Enforcing standards
- Maintaining integrity, and
- Balancing of conflicting requirements.
This database contains 97 data sleients divided into two
(Ref. 10.] basic groups:
1. static data elements.
2. Dynamic data elements.
A. STATIC DATA ELEMENTS
Static data elements consist of data that will not
change frequently.
For example:
Main Identification constitutes a group by itself
containing the elements numbered 1 J 1 to 108. Data elements
rarely retrieved by applications programs are entered into
Personnel Characteristic (element ft 200) which in turn are
divided into the following four sub-groups:
1. Marriage subgroup (element # 303) containing elements
numbered 301 and 302.
2. Address subgroup (element # -HO) containing elements
numbered 401 to 403 .
12

3. Body characteristic subgroup (element # 500)
containing elements numbered 501 to 511.
4. Category and Status subgroup (element # 600)
containing elements numbered 501 to 607.
B. DYNAMIC DATA ELEMENTS.
Dynamic data elements are those which are frequently
changed. They are divided into several subgroups corre-
sponding to their historical data. These groups include:
1. Rank group (element # 700) containing elements
numbered 701 to 707.
2. Profession group (element # 330) containing elements
numbered 80 1 to 8 10.
3. Education group (element # 900) containing elements
numbered 901 to 9 09.
4. Education group (element # 1100> containing elements
numbered 1101 to 1106. This group is divided into two
subgroups
:
a. Activity and profession subgroup (element # 1200)
containing elements numbered 1201 to 1204.
t. Family education subgroup (element # 1300)
containing elements numb
2
red 1301 to 1303.
5. Payroll group (element # 1400) containing elements
numbered 1401 to 1414.
6. Security group (element # 15 3 0) containing elements
numbered 1501 tO 1506. This group is divided into the
following two (2) subgroups:
a. who involved subgroup (element # 1500) containing
elements numbered 1601 to 1603.
b. Measures subgroup (element # 1700) containing
element numbered 1701 to 1703.
(For complete overview of element numbering see Appendix A.)
13

The above database systam foras i hierarchy as ilus
tratsd in the model below:
MAINID
PERSCH&R RANK PR3FF EDUC FAN PAYROLL SEC
MARR ADDR BODYCHAR CATEG SaBJ FACT FEDUC WHO MEAS
}'4

III. THE NEED FOR SECURI3?I PROTECTION
A. GENERAL APPROACH
The use of automata! data processing equipment has
become widespread because it permits the handling and
storage of vast amounts of information at an affordable
cost
.
The military benefits from the use of computers include
spaed and accuracy of data collsction which results in
timely and improved decisions. Besiis these advantages a new
hard-to-solve problem emerges, that of information security.
The basic problem is illustratsi in Figure 3.1 Users and
data at variDus security levels desire simultaneous access
to the machine's resources.
Data with all security levels are stored on the system.
Users with proper security credentials are granted data
accesses. Navy security policy raguires that an individual
must possess the required non-discreticnary 1 and discre-
tionary 2 privileges before being granted access to the
information.
In fact, application of coraputsrs in Indonesia is new,
so careful considerations should accompany the design and
implementation of the basic concepts of database security.
1 Non-discretionary security requires that the individual
has a security clearence of higher or equal level than the
level of the information requested.
2 Discretiorary security requires that the individual

























* STORAGE FACILITY : MULTI LEVEL
* USER PROCESSING : CONCURRENT MULTI USER/LEVEL





Figara 3.1 Problem Description.
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Frequent foal play often takes place because of the lack.
of protection when using computer systems , as well as
protection of the database systems.
In the military, particularly, information is very
important. Leakage or corruption of military information
could endanger national security. Information about secret
weapons, numbers and distribution of personnel, emergency
procedures, and personnel background /data are all very
important to the enemy. On the other hand, for authorized
users updated data is very important since an error in the
data may produce faulty decisions.
B. DEFINITIONS
Many definitions are used in database security. The
most widely used definitions acoording to Fenandez E.3.
(1981) [Ref. 5] are:
" Information security is the protection of information
against unauthorized disclosure, alteration, or destruc-
tion."
" Database security is the protecti
that is maintained in a database."
on of information
C. SECURITY THREATS
A database security violation nay take form as unauthor-
ized reading, modification, or destruction of information
stored in the database. Possible threats to the security of
a computer system may be broadly classified as either mali-








Failure of protection mechanisms
Contribution to software failure
SYSTEMS SOFTWARE










Duplication of confidential reports
Loading of insecure system
Theft of confidential material
SYSTEMS PROGRAMMER
Bypass of security mechanisms
Disarming of security mechanisms
Installation of insecure system
Location in insecure environment
TERMINAL USER
Fraudulent uentification





Unauthorised access to computer room
From:
Database Security & Integrity
By E.B. Fernandez
Figure 3.2 Security Threats.
In Figure 3.2 , we see the possibility of a malicious
conduct by exploiting loopholes in the system. There are
also threats resulting from human srrors, suoh as acciden-
tally destroying information, or allowing it to be se an by
unauthorized people. In addition, natural disasters may
destroy or pravent access to information. These threats are
classified as nonmalicious threats.
18

D. SECURITY PROCEDURES A»D MECHAHISSS
Security threats arise from a wide variety of sources,
therefore procedures and mechanisms necessary to provide a
secure environment must cover many areas of the enterprise.
External procedures aust be sat up so that security
mechanisms implemented within the system can be effective.
We must select personnel who have access to highly classi-
fied information through security cLearance procedures.
Storage devices and other hardware oust be physically
protected against any damage from natural disasters or mali-
cious attack. Protection of removable storage against theft
is also necessary. We also need backup systems for copying
data files at different locations to protect against infor-
mation loss.
Information may be stolen or tapped during transmis-
sions, and encryption is one way to protect this data.
In summary, the security of a database depends on a
complex set of protective measures: human, software, and
hardware [Ref. 14].
E. SECURITY POLICIES
An access-control 3 system determines the way a subject*
may access 5 data or objects. 6
3 Access-control. A strategy for protecting obiects from
unauthorized access.
Subject. An active user of a computer system together
with any other entity acting on behalf of a user or on
behalf of the system; for example, processes, jobs, and
procedures may be considered subjects. Certain subjects may
also be considered to be objects of the system.
5 Access. The ability and the leans necesary to store or
retrieve data, to communicate with, or otherwise make use of
any resource in a computer system.
6 0bject. In a formal security model, an identifiable
resource, data container or related entity of the system;
the counterpart of subject. Software-created entities such
19

There are many kinds of access-oontrol policies and they
depend upon the categories of information and the positions









Figure 3.3 Access-type-dependent Access Control.
Figure 3.3, shows a situation where nor everybody can
see the whols file. Users are given access to the file,
according to their position.
as files, programs and directories are objects, as well as








d - delete, and
3 - execute
An execute access is often used but omitted from this
model due to the fact that execute access in the proposed
protection architecture is similar to a read access.
To be qualified to access specific data, a user must
conform to the military security conventions of classifica-
tion, category, and need-to-know.
Figure 3-4 Coabination of Compartment and Levels.
In military, for example, the Army, Navy and Air Force have
different kinds of categories of files ranging from top
secret to unclassified files. Thus by a combination of
21

compartmentaiization and levels, a good policy for control
information flow can be crsated.
F. MULTILEVEL HODEL
This model introduces the concspt of levals and catego-
ries. Each subject is assigned a clearance level, and each
object is assign a classification lsvel. Every person in
the military has different security levels that permit how
far (s) he may access the file and how much (s)h9 can see the
file. Therefore a security levsl is a composite of: { A, B
}, where A is the classification lsvel and B is the set of
categories.
One security level is said to dominate another if and
only if:
1. its classification or clearance level > the
other, and
2. its category set contains the other.
Clearance and classification levels are ordered as
follows:
top secret > secret
secret > confidential
confidential > unclassified
Security levels are only partially ordered however, so that
some subjects and objects are not comparable. In Figure 3.5
, L2 is dominated by L1 , since its level of classification
and its set of categories is higher. On the other hand
security levels of L1 and L3, ar= not comparable. The























Figare 3.5 Ordering of Security Level.
Access to an object can be through either observing
(READ) the object or altering (APPEND) the object, and from





The multilevel model considers tha states of a secure
system, which are described by:
1. the current access set, which is a set of triples
( subject, object, access type ) or (s,c,t),




i Subject s Process
Object o Data, files. . . .




Security level (Classification, category set)
Access attribute t No observe, no alter- observe only, observe and alter;
alter only
Access matrix Discretionary security
Request Cnanges current access or otr-er aspects of system
state
(s. o, t) Current access
Decision Yes. no error, or ?





Figure 3.6 Elements of the Hultileval Hodel.
3. the security level of each subject, ar.d
4. the maximum and currant security levels of each
subject.
1. uirements to Read Data from a Data Set
A user may read a set of data if, and only if his
clearance dominates the classification of a data set. The
clearance of user (U) dominates a set of data (D) if, and
only if,
military classification (U) > military classification (D)
category (CF) c category (D)
U need-to- know ( read D)
24

2 • R equir ement to Wri t e Data i i t o a Data Set
A usee may not write data into a set of data if the
classification of the data he is writing dominates the clas-
sification of the data into which ae is writing. That is
,
if the user wishes to write data (d) into data set (D) , it
is required that
military classification (d) < military classification (D)
category (d) 2 category ( D)
U need-to-fcnow (write D)
25

17. THE MOLTICS CONCEPTS
A. GENERAL CONCEPT
The Multiplexed Information and Computing System
[Kef. 1] (MULTICS) , employs the coaoept of rings of protec-
tion, based on:
1. Need to know, and
2. Firewall, to minimize damage due tc errors.
Basically protection of data oc objects in Multics is
achieved by compartmentalizing all of zhe stored information
into discrete packages called segmaats, where each is asso-
ciated with a set of access attribat ss.
This chapter will discuss the concepts of access
coatrol, protection, and filing coacepts in Multics, since
these filing ooncepts will be a basis for the implementation
of the existiag personnel database in the following chapter.
B. ACCESS CONTROL AND PROTECTION
In Multics, compartmeatalizatioa [Ref. 11] is achieved
through two primary mechaaisms:
1. Per-Segment Access Control
2. Concentric Rings of Protectioa
These mechanisms complement ona another.
1 • P er-se gment Access Control
Per-Segmeat access Control is a means of denoting
and controlliag the type of access to a particular shared
segment given to an individual usar. A segment may be
26

shared by two or more processes. The subject who creates the
segment and grants permission id shar= to a us^r, may
specify the type of access to be given to each grantee. 3y
this privilege, Multics guarantees that a user can safeguard
the information he creates and files away for future use.
Multics permits the coexistence of many processes, each of
which competes for the system's physical resources and
employs the same file system hierarchy.
The hierarchical directory structure in Multics
which controls the file system loo«s like ordinary file. It
includesauthors, users listing and access type permitted to
each user which is granted individually. Each author listed
in the directory is associated with a file in the access
control list ( ACL ) .
2. Concentric Rings of Pr ote ction
The ring mechanism, by contrast, offers intraprccess
protection cf a segment. . The concentric-rings concept is
essentially a generalization of S (supervisor) and U (user)
domains. The segments of any process are associated with a
set cf generally two cr possibly mors concentric rings.
A ring procedure prevents any user from referring to
inner ring data segments which have higher level classifica-
tion. A user is permitted to access more privileged proce-
dures only through specially controlled entry points called
"gates".
By subsetting the segments of a process into rings
and by effectively controlling interactions and communica-
tion between segments of different rings (supevisory or
userlike) , Multics has the potential to isolate trouble and
limit the damage in the system. When an outside ring is
damaged, this will not effect the inner ring, but damage tc




Ring brackets are associated with
segments as shown in Figure 4.1 .
accessible
Figure 4.1 Segment Privileges.
Read and Writs privileges are always associated with a ring-
bracket starting at ring 0. In Figure 4.1 for example, the
read bracke* is defined as ring 3 to ring 4, which means
that if a process is currently being execut-d in ring
0,1,2,3 or 4, then it may read the segment.
The Call bracket is defined as ring 5 and 6, which
means that only when a process is executing in ring 5 or 6
can it call this segment when the ssgment is being executed,
as the process is in ring 3.
28

In Multics , all storage are organized as named
segments, and the segment is the unit of protection. A
segment can contain either data or procedures.
A Multics process is usually associated with an end
user who is identified by a unique number. In the da-abase
context an eni user invoices a database application program
by combining a number of procedures. Eventually one cf these
procedures will call a DBMS proceiure, which in -urn may
call other DBHS or operating-system procedures. The user can
build protected subsystems by grouping procedures into
segments that can then be protected from one another.
Associated with each process is a descriptor
segment, which is a vector of segment descriptor words
(SDWs) providing addressability to all- the segments acces-
sible to the process. A directory system is used to locate a
segment when it is first referenced by a process. The direc-
tory entry for a segment contains an access-control list
specifying which users can access tie segment and what their
rights are. If the requested access is authorized, the
segment is added to the user's virtual memory by adding the
appropriate SDH to the usee's descriptor segment.
Initially all information is stored in the access-
control list. However, when the segment is first referenced,
the information is copied into the 5DW for the segment. For
every subsequent access by the process the SDW alone is
checked by hardware to determine whether an access is
authorized.
C. HOLTICS FILE SYSTEM
The Multics filing system consists of two modules:
Segment Control and Directory Control. Here, file and
segment are entirely synonymous, since the concept of
segment is merely an extension of the concept of file.
29

The segment Control Module (SCM) interprets the intent
of the user's symbolic references to segments. It determines
to which, if any, of the segmeti-s already known to the
process a given symbolic name refers. If none, the Segment
Control Module must then determine if a new segment is to be
created and placed in the hierarchy.
When using the SCM, a Known Segment Table (KST) is
needed to store segments currently part of the process. SCM
maintains control over these refarsnce-name-segoent-number
pairs in a given process. Its job is to develop and reuse
each name-number pair in its proper soatext.
The directory Control Module (DZM) is used to search all
inquiries about the status or location of segments and/or
their descriptions, because only this module is permitted to
read and alter the contents of the directory segments.
1 . Direct ory St ructure
This filing system has a directory structure that
contains two types of entries which may be added to it:
1 . branches and
2. links.
A branch is a detailed description of a segment
located in the secondary storage of records that comprise
the segment. A link is a special kind of named entry whose
purpose is to point to another entry, normally in some (any)
other directory. This allows a useful form of cross-
referencing capability, to be superimposed over the basic
tree structure formed by the branch- type entries. Figure






By E. I. Organ ick
Figure 4.2 Conceptual Model of tha Pile-systaa Tree Structure,
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To reach a certain branch, a certain path is needed
using path_nams and rslati? e_path_name. A path_name f is a
list of the node names from the root to -he branch (or link)
inclusive, where elements of the list are separated by the
">" character. For example, to search for "sub" the
following path name is used:
"> user_dir_dir > projectl > usara1_directory > sub",
and to search for "sort" the oath name used is:
">user_dir_dir > projscti > useca 1_diract ory > sort"
directory path name entry
name
path name for the branoh (or link)
In other words, the Multics link is considers! a shorthand
for symbolic pathname, therefore, it introduces no addi-
tional structure.
Figurs 4.3 shows rhat from iirectory A, the symbolic
name "E" is shorthand for " > B > E ". Any oath name may
begin with " > ", if a path name begins with other than "
>* , the given path is referred to as a relative path name.
At all times, an executing process is associated
with a working directory. This is a directory the process
happens tc be currently "using". It is merely a reference
marker to a point in the hierarchy from which it becomes
convenient to describe a relative path to other segments.
32

Figure 4,3 Interpretation of Links,
Thus, a tres path to a particular node may be described
relative to the working directory of a process. For example
referring to Figure 4. 2 the path name for sort is simply
"sort", and the path name for delets is "a1_library > deleta
•
It is also possible to use the relative path-name
convention when referring to a branch that is not a descen-
dant of the working directory. This is done with the aid of
the character "<". It is interpreted as parent of the
working directory. And "<<" would nean parent of parent of
the working directory, and sc on. For example, relative
path name far < usera3_directcry > is "« project2 >
usera3_directory" or " user__dir_iir > project2 >
user a 3_ directory"
33

2. Elements of a Secure Maltis s
Corresponding to a szate (b,M,f,H) is a set of
information structure in Multics * Bef. 2]. The. following
correspondences have been identified:
b - Segment Descriptor Words (SDW)
M - Access Control List (ACL)
f - Information in directory segments and




MODE OF ACCESS (R,E,W,A)






Figure 4.4 Data Structure of an ACL for an Individual Branch.
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An element (Si, Oj, x) in b indicates that subject
Si has current access to object Oj in access mode x.
In SDW is a field which indicates access permission
(write, read, execute, or append)
An entry in H such as { r,w } indicates that subject
Si has read and write permission with respect to object Oj,
if Oj is a data segment.
As example of the data structure of an access-















Figure 4.5 Baltics Hierarchiy Equivalen-
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3« Retrieving File-branch Information
The hierarchy H of the iodel is structured to
reflect the tree structure among segments realized by
branches in Baltics. If Oi and Oj are objects in the model
and H (Oi) inclides Oj, then Oi is tae parent of Oj. Figure
4.5 shows this situation.
^user-directory-directory^
{userl-director^ ^user2-director$Aiser3-directory\ ^user4-directory^ \
V I
Figure 4.6 Chain of Links.
When directory control is supplied a path name for
the purpose of retrieving corresponding file-branch informa-
tion, the desired directory entry is retrieved by link or
branch. If it is a branch, the target has been reached, and
if it is a link the path name found in a link is then
employed for a repetition of the retrievel process. It is
possible that a chain of links evetually leads to a branch.
36

Figure 4. 6 shows hew user4 grants permission to
user3, and aser3 grants permission to user2 to use their'
routines. If user2 and nser3 appear in the access control
list for <b> in aser4»s user directory, then user2 may use
"d" as a symbolic reference and user3 may use "c" as a





V. IMPLEMENTATION OF HULTICS II DATABASE SECORITX
The tasic security model including data security in
Multics has been discussed in the previous chapter. Before
we further discuss the implementation of database security
we will take some assumptions as followed: Firstly,
although the Multics system was developed and applied to
operating systems for Honeywell conputers, we will assume
that it can also be used by o*1- her CDmputers in general.
Secondly, we assume that users in the Indonesian Navy
database system are limited tc five assistants for Chief of
Staff of the Indonesian Navy, namely:
1. Assistant for Security
2. Assistant for Operations
3. Assistant for Personnel
4. Assistant for Logistics
5. Assistant for Planning
The second assumption is needed because there are some
offices supervised by the Assistants which currently deal
with the personnel database system.
The description of a directory has been discussed in
Chapter IV, therefore we will not discuss how to find a
segment in this chapter.
The personnel database in the Indonesian Navy is divided
into 17 segments. The method propssed here adds 2 segments
which are:
Segment 400, which is followed by elements number
401-403, is divided into two, namely segment 400 which is
followed by elements number 401 and segment 500 which is
followed by elements number 50 1. Tais change is needed since
element's owners are different.
38

For the same reason, segment 500 which is followed by
elements 501-502, is divided into two segments, namely
segment 600 followed by elements number 601-607 and segment
700 followed by elements number 701-705.
All changes are shown in the table in Appendix C.
We can summarize to this point that the personnel data-
base is now divided into 19 segments and there are 5 users,
which follow the sequence of assistant staffs. It has been
determined who owns each segment, and each owner has the
authority to update the contents of his segment (s).
To implemsnt the new security method mentioned above, it
is necessary to set up a table containing all segments and
their relation to each user. Th2 table tells what segment
belongs to whom and what kind of aroesses are authorized to
other users. In this case the D3A (Database Administrator)
can arrange the table in the proper order.
TABLE I
Access Table
ELM DATA-NAHETYPE OF ACCESS
# S1 S2 53 S4 S5
100 MAINID R R BWAD




4 00 ADDR R RWAD
500 ADDRSTA R RW AD
60 BODYCHAR RHAD
700 PERSIZ R RWAD
300 CATEG R S BWAO R
900 RANK R R RWAD R
1000 PROFESS R R SHAD
1100 EDOC R R RWAD
1200 SUEJ R R RWAD
1300 FAM R RHAD

















3. Confidant ial, and
4. Unclassified
Segment nimbers 1700, 1800, and 1900 are in the classi-
fied levels and the ether segments classifications will be




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECDHHSNDATIONS
It is justified here to draw some conclusions and make
recommendations concerning the importance of personnel data-
base security in the Indonesian Navy.
The conclusions can be describe! as follows:
1. Database security is very important to any database
system, especially in the military.
2. The Muitics system provides basic concepts to achieve
a sound database security system.
3. The Indonesian Navy personnel database security can
be improved by applying such concepts as the one
described in this thesis.
In order to implement this security model in the
Indonesian Navy database personnel system, it is recommended
to:
1. Assign security personnel under the DBA who will be
responsible for the security of the existing data-
base.
2. Conduct further research to explore possible enhance-






Each of these tables contains two elements: cod^ and











V4 Temporary 3o vernment^sf f icial
15 Pre_Governraent_cf f icial
16 Civilian_Governmen-_3f ficial










5 Waiting for placement
5 Waiting for direction
7 Pre_retired
3 Money waiting (tJT)
9 Retirad
2 Female
1 Married 2 No* married
43

5. CHILDREN ALLOWANCE STATUS:
1 Claimed by him/ 2 Claimed by spouse
herself
6. HOUSING STATUS:
1 Government-quarters 4 Private/owned
2 Mess 5 Rented
3 Ship 5 Contract/leased
7 With relations
7. BLOOD TYPE:
1 A H 3
2 B 3 X
3 AB
8. COLOR 3F SKIN:
1 White 4 Yellow-brown
2 Yellow 5 Brown
3 Black
9. HAIR:
1 Sraight-lank 3 Straight- stiff
2 Curly 4 Wavy
10. COLOR OF EYES :
1 Black 3 Brown
2 Blue if Sreen
11. SIZE OP PANTS/SHIRT:
1 Small 3 Large
2 Medium
12. RELIGION:









14. TYPE OF PROMOTION:
1 Regular
2 Extraordinary
15. STATUS OF PLACEMENT:
Organic
1 Labor (non organic)
2 In charge (detached
from parent command)




S po u s e
1 Child number 1
2 Child number 2
3 Child number 3











4 Honour-grace (post. humous)
3 In assistance (temporary
additional duty)
4 In direction (independen -
duty)
3 Incomplete •
5 Chili number 5
5 Child number 6
7 Child number 7
3 Child number 8








84 Sacond Assistant Lisatanant








58 First Admiral (Commoiore) /Brigadier General
57 Rear Admiral/Major General
55 Vice Admiral/Li euteiant General
55 Admiral/General
B Civilian
48 Group I/A 27 Group III/B
47 Group I/B 26 Group III/C
46 Group I/C 25 Group III/D
45 Group I/D 18 Group IV/\
38 Group IT/A 17 Group IV/B
37 Group II/3 16 Group IV/C
36 Group II/C 15 Group IV /D



















300 Electronics (for officer only)
35 1 Radio
362 Radio-Radar Mechanic




36 7 Weapon Electro Mechanic
36 8 Electronica




454 Air Defence Artillery
46 5 Tank
46 6 Pans am (Amphibious Tanic)
467 Transportation






































857 Nav-Informa tion Defaces
858 Air Traffic Controller
48











006 technical Administra cion
03 7 Typist
008 Stencil Mechanic
































































06 9 Parking Master
070 Fire Brigade





076 Petr o-chemical Technician
077 Geography
078 Miscellaneous
20. GRO0P CODE OF EDUCATION:
000 General Development
001 Sationa'i Defense
002 Joint Command S Staff College
003 Command S Staff College Level
004 2nd Officer Continuing Education Level
005 1st Officer Continuing Education Level
011 UCO Continuing Education Level
100 Formation
101 Military Academy Level
102 Fundamental Officer Education Level
103 Candidate Officer Education Level
111 Candidate NCO Education Level
112 Candidate Corporal Education Level
113 Candidate Enlisted Education Level
200 Labor
201 Labor Education Level
51

300 3en eral Education
301 University Level
302 Academy Level
303 Senior High School Level
304 Junior High School Level
305 Elementary School Lsvsl (graduate)
306 Elementary school level (not graduate)





































This table will be corapla-ed later by an
Itelligence/Security officer, since tha author does not have





This data dictionary contains descriptions of the
Personnel Data Base segments (data elements groups) and
their data elements. There are six columns in the table:
1. Element Number (ELM #) . The data element/segment
number contains four digits. The first two digits is
the segment number, beginning from the root and
increasing by one (leading zeroes suppressed) , and
another two digits for the data element number in the
segment beginning from one ana increasing by one.
2. Data Element (DATA_ ELEMENT) . This column contains
data element/segment name as it is known to the
users.
3. Data Name (DATA_NAME). This column contains the
unique name for data element /segment which is to be
used by programmer/user when retrieving data from the
Database.
4. Type (TYPE). This column contains the data element's
type where N means Numeric and AN means
Alpha-Numeric.
5. Number of Character ( OF CHAR). This column cotains
number of characters in the record field of the data
element /segment.
6. Description (DESCRIPTION). This column contains the
description of the data elsment/segment . Described
are the data element/segment, relationships (depen-
dent, root, etc.), key record/segment, administrative
54

control, usage, and identifications. This description
helps the programmer/ user tn find ths path tc desire
data elements/segments in the database.
The abbreviations used in the data dictionary tabla are:
DB for Database, segm for segmen, lev for level, tbl for
table. YYMMDD for Year (two digits} , Month (two digits) and
Date (two digits), occur for occurrence, dependt fcr depen-
dent. Kg for Kilogram, and Cm for Centimeter.
ELM DATA-ELEMENT DATA- TY- #OF DESCRIPTION
# NAME PE CHAR
100 Main identification MAINID 76 Root segm DB
lev 1 f segm 1,
one occur
101 Personal Serial SERNOM N 9 Record key
Number (Main Key)
102 Name NAME AN 26 Name, title
103 Corps CORPS N 3 See corps tbl
(19)
104 Sex SEX N 1 See sex tbl (3)
105 Birth date DMBIRTH N 6 YYMMDD
106 Birth place PMBIRTH AN 15 Town (city)
107 Religion RELIGION N 1 See religion
tbl (12)
108 Tribe TRIBE AN 15









































504 Color of skin
505 Hair
506 Color of eyes




WEIGHT N 3 In Kg
HEIGHT N 3 la Cm
BLOOD 8 1 See blood type
tbl (7) , segm
key
SKIN N 1 See color of
skin tbl (8)
HAIR N 1 See hair tbl
(9)
EYES N 1 See color of
56

507 Size of shoes
508 Size of hat
509 Size of pants







PANTS N 1 Sae pant shirr
tbl (11)
SHIRT N 1 See pant shirt
tbl (11)
CHEST N 2 -
600 Category and status CATEG
601 Original personal
status




604 Date of current
personal status
605 Personal category










CAT EGO R!f N
DTGORY
DTACT






















702 Status of rank
703 Date cf rank
704 Number of decision
letter
705 Date of decision
letter
706 Who gave the
decision letter
707 Type of promotion
SANKG N 2 See rank tbl
(18), segm key
STRANK N 1 See status of
rank tbl (13)
DTRANK N 6 YYMMDD




DTDECLET N 6 YYMMDD
GVDECLEr AN 15 Official
functionary




801 Name of profession
802 Number Df decision





PROFESS 71 Dependt segm of
root, lev 2,
segm 4, repeated
NMPROF AN 15 -






: M on th
: Year
DTPROF N 6 NNNNNN -YYMMDD

















810 Date of placement
DTWARP N 6 NNNNNN-YYMMDD
ECHELON U 2 See echelon
tbl (21)
STATION N 3 See station tbl
(22)
DTSTAT 8 6 YYMMDD
STPLACE N 1 See status of
placement tbl
(15)
DTPLACE N 6 YYMMDD
900 Education EDOC













73 Dependt segm of
r:o:, lev 2,
segm 9, rspeated
3 S=9 group code
of education





EDUCSD N 6 YYMMDD
EDUCCM N 6 YYMMDD
EDSTAT N 3 See station
tbl (22)
EDTOWN AN 15 -
RESULT N 1 393 result of
education tbl
(16)
CSTAND N 3 -
CSIZE N 3 -






= e g D> 10,
repeated
SUBJECT AN 15 Segm key


















76 Dependt segm of
coot, lev 2,
segm 6, repeated
AN 26 Same, title
N 1 See family
relation tbl
( 17) , segm key
N 1 See sex tbl (3)
N 6 YYMMDD
AN 15 Town (city)




1201 Name of activity
1202 Place of activity
1203 Start date
1204 Completion date
FACT 48 Dependt segm of
F&a, lev 3,
repeated
FN ACT AN 26 Segm key
FPACT AN 15 Town (city)
FSACT N 6 YYHHDD
FCACT N 6 JYHMDD






1301 Education FEDNACT AN 15
Institute's Name
1302 Group cods of FCDACT N 3 Sss group cods
education of education
tbl (20) , segm
fcey
1303 Result of FEDRES N 1 Ses result of
education education tbl
(16)






N 2 See rank tbl
(18)
N 3 In Month
N 1 -
1401 Date cf begining DBPAY
payroll
1402 Rank in payroll RKPAY
1403 Payroll period PERPAY
1404 Number of children CHFAM
authorized family
allowence
1405 Status of children STCHFAM N 1 See children
authorized family allowance
allowence status tbl (5)
1406 Main saLary MAINSAL N 6 In Pupiah
1407 Wife's family WFALL N 5 In Rupiah
allowance
1408 Children family CHALL N 5 In Rupiah
allowance
1409 Other family OTALL N 5 In Rupiah
allowance






1414 Unit of payroll
RCRED N 5 In Rupiah
OTRBD N 5 In Rupiah
T0T3AL N 6 In Rupiah
ONPAY N 4 S?s station








SEC 35 Dependt segm of




VTYPE N 1 See violation/
infringe type
tbl (23) , segm
key
WHAT N 3 See what tbl
(24)
WHERE AN 15 Town (city)
WHEN N 6 JYHMDD














INVNAME AN 26 Segm key




1603 Profession PROFINV AN 15




1701 Type of action
1702 Start dare
1703 Completion date
HEAS 27 Dependt seg m of
SEC, lev 3, segm
15, repeated
NMEAS AN 15 Segm key
SMEAS N 6 JYMMDD





This data dictionary contains inscriptions of the Personnel
Data Base segments (data elements groups) and their data
elements. rhere are six columns in the table:
(See Appendix B for abbreviations)
ELS DATA-ELEMENT DATA- TY- #OF DESCRIPTION
t NAME PE CHAR
100 Main identification MAINID 76 Root segm DB









107 Religion RELIGION N 1 See religion
fcbl (12)
108 Tribe TRIBE AN 15





SERN03 N 9 Record key
(Main Key)
NAME AN 26 Name, title
CORPS N 3 See corps t bl
(19)
SEX N 1 See sex tbl (3)
DMBIRTH N 6 YYMMDD





302 Date of status
MARST
MARDT
7 Dependt segm of
CHARACT, lev 3,
39am 3, repeated


















segm 5 r repeated
See housing
e tat us tbl (6)
segm key
YYMMDD








WEIGHT N 3 In Kg
HEIGHT N 3 In Cm
BLOOD N 1 See blood typ
tbl (7) , segm
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604 Color of skin
605 Hair
606 Color of eyes
700 Personal size
701 Size of shoes
702 Size of hat
703 Size of pants
704 Size of shirt
705 Size of chest
key
SKIN N 1 See color of
skin tbl (8)
HAIR N 1 5r? hair tbl
(9)
EYES N 1 See color of
ayes tbl (10)
PERSIZ 8 Dependt segm of
S3DYCHAR, level
4, segm 7, on
a
occur
SHOES N 2 -
HAT N 2 -









800 Category and status CATEG
801 Original personal ORPERST N
status








29 Dependt segm of
CHARACT, lev 3,











805 Personal category CATEGORY N 1 See personal
category tbl
(2)
806 Date of personal DTGORY N 6 YYMMDD
category






902 Status of rank




39 Dspendt seg m of
:::t, lev 2,
segm 9, repeated
2 See rank tbl
(18) , segm key
1 See status of
rank tbl (13)
6 YYMMDD
904 Number of decision NBDECLET AN 8 Format: NNNNMMYY
letter
905 Date of decision
letter
906 Who gave the
decision letter






GVDECLET AN 15 Official
functionary
TPPROM N 1 See type of
promotion tbl
(MX)





1001 Name of profession
1002 Number of decision












1010 Date of placement
repeated
NMFROF AN 15 -









DTWARP N 6 NNNNNN-YYMMDD
ECHELON N 2 See echelon
tbl (21)
STATION N 3 See station tbl
(22)
DTSTAT N 6 YYMMDD
STPLACE N 1 See status of
placement tbl
(15)
DTPLACE N 6 YYMMDD
1100 Education



























EDUCSD N 6 YYMMDD
EDUCCM N 6 YYMMDD
EDSTAT N 3 See ststion
tbl (22)
EDTOWN AN 15 -
RESULT N 1 See result of
education tbl
(16)
CSTAND N 3 -








SUBJECT AN 15 Segm key














FNAME AN 26 Name, title
FREL N 1 See family
relation tbl
(17), segm key
FSEX N 1 See sex tbl (3)
FDBIRTH N 6 YYMMDD
FPBIRTH AN 15 Town (city)
FPRELIGI N 1 5ee religion
tbl (12)




1401 Name of activity
1402 Place of activity
1403 Start data
1404 Completion date




FNACT AN 26 Segm key
FPACT AN 15 Towr. (city)
FSACT N 6 IYHHDD


























1601 Date of begining
payroll













1603 Payroll period PERPAY N 3 In Month
1604 Number af children CHFAM N 1
authorized family
allowenca














1614 Unit of payroll






MAINS A L N 6 In Rupiah
WFALL N 5 In Rupiah
CHALL N 5 In Rupiah
OTALL N 5 In Rupiah
OB RED N 5 In Rupiah
RCRED N 5 In Rupiah
OTRED N 5 In Rupiah
TOTSAL N 6 In Rupiah








1701 Violation/Infringe VTYPE K 1 See viola ti en/
infringe type
tbl (23) f segm
ksy
1702 What WHAT N 3 See what tbl
(24)






WHEN N 6 YYMMDD






HOW N 5 Same as 1505













INVNAME AN 26 S a gm key









1901 Type of action
190 2 Start date
1903 Completion date
MEAS 27 Dependt segm of
SEC, lev 3, segm
19, repeated
NMEAS AN 15 Sagm key
SMEAS N 6 YYMMDD
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